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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Contracts—Releases—Release May Be Set Aside in Equity—Mutual
Mistake of Fact.—Ruggles v. Selby.'—Three months after a collision
allegedly caused by defendant's negligence, plaintiff and her husband signed
a statement releasing the defendant from all claims for injuries known and
unknown arising from the collision. Within a month after the signing of
the release plaintiff's husband developed symptoms of a serious brain injury
which within two months thereafter rendered him completely incompetent,
mentally and physically. At the time of the release, the medical prognosis
showed no sign of such injury and plaintiff received a total of $900 for the
relinquishment of his claims against the defendant. Plaintiff brought suit
as conservatrix of her husband's estate, seeking to have the release set aside
and recovery for injuries received as a result of defendant's negligence. At
the trial, medical evidence was presented to show that the injury was a
consequence of the collision, though of a type not immediately apparent.
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. HELD: A release purporting
to cover all claims for injuries, known and unknown, foreseen and un-
foreseen, may be set aside in equity where there was a mutual mistake of
fact regarding the nature and extent of injuries sustained, since the up-
holding of the release would be unconscionable.
This result is in keeping with a liberal trend setting aside releases
which have been entered into in good faith, but which have proven in-
equitable because of mutual mistakes of fact. 2
Out-of-court settlements are, of course, regarded with favor since they
avoid costly and lengthy trials. Only the most substantial evidence of
fraud, duress, coercion, or mutual mistake will suffice to set aside a release.8
It is the desire of courts to protect the integrity and legal effect of such
instruments, and they may not be attacked on capricious grounds. How-
ever, where subsequent events which present themselves within a reasonable
time render a release grossly unfair and unjust, 4 an equity court may
scrutinize the agreement to determine if it was fairly made and reflected
the intentions of the parties.
Although the release in question purported to forego all claims for
injuries known and unknown (a fairly standard clause in such instruments)
it is obvious that the parties, unaware of the extent of the injuries sustained,
did not tender and accept the consideration for those injuries which came to
light a month later. The $900 given failed to cover all the plaintiff's known
expenses for personal injuries and property damage. The plaintiff's case
was presented on the theory that although the agreement was clear and
unambiguous, subsequent events rendered it inequitable.
In contrast to the principal case is O'Donnell v. Langdon,5 decided in
1 25 Iii. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960).
2 Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957); Estes v. Magee, 62
Idaho 82, 109 P.2d 631 (1957); Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App, 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941).
3 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1950).
4 Compaie § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code which allows the court to
scrutinize a contract in order to avoid an unconscionable result.
5 170 Ohio St. 528, 166 N.E.2d 756 (1960).
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CASE NOTES
Ohio shortly after the principal decision in Illinois. There the plaintiff sought
to have a release set aside on the ground that he believed it was one relating
only to claims for property damage, although the agreement clearly stated
it was a full release of "all claims . . and causes of action on account
of injuries resulting from collision of motor vehicles."° The court, however,
rejected plaintiff's claim and held the general release could not be set aside on
such grounds. It would appear that the plaintiff would have been more
successful if he had sought to have the release wholly set aside for the reason
that injuries developed which could not have been known at the time the
release was signed thereby rendering the $59.50 settlement inequitable.
While the Ohio court narrowly confined its decision to the point that it
would not allow a general release to be overcome by the allegation of the
suing party that the settlement was for property damage alone, it is possible
that if the plaintiff had sought to have the release set aside on the suggested
grounds, the court would have followed its decision in Connolley v. United
States Steel Company, 7
 in which it stated, "Where one injured in an accident
reads and understands the contract of settlement and release, signs the con-
tract for a valid consideration, and makes no claim that the contract was
procured by fraud, and makes no application to set it aside, he is bound by
its terms . . . ."8
In the light of this language, the Ohio court might have been disposed
to reach a decision similar to that in the principal case.
The true impact of the Ruggles case is felt by a prospective defendant
who in an out-of-court settlement seeks a release in the most comprehensive
terms. In considering his position, it must be borne in mind that as a
practical proposition, releases are rarely attacked because of after-discovered
injuries.
In Ruggles, the court scrupulously confined itself to the facts before it.
It is possible that given a material change in the facts, the settlement would
not have been found so unfair as to be unconscionable. Since the facts
weigh so heavily it is difficult to formulate a definitive rule on the basis of
the case. In this, as in other areas of equity jurisdiction, a court must trust
more to the application of its discretion to the facts given, than to the appli-
cation of a strict and stable line of precedent.
SHEILA M. MCCUE
Copyright Protection of Original Designs—Absence of Statutory No-
tice.—Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.'—The plaintiff,
Peter Pan Fabrics Inc., engaged in the business of purchasing uncolored
cloth, printing designs upon it, and reselling the finished cloth to dress
Id. at 529, 166 N.E.2d at 757.
7 161 Ohio St. 448, 119 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
8 Id. at 451, 119 N.E.2d at 847.
1 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)
(L. Hand, J., Friendly, J. dissenting), 73 Harv, L. Rev. 1613.
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